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We study the impact of barriers to entry on workplace training. Our theoretical model 
indicates that there are two contrasting effects of deregulation on training. With a given 
number of firms, deregulation reduces the size of rents per unit of output that firms can reap 
by training their employees. Yet, the number of firms increases, thereby raising output and 
profit gains from training and improving investment incentives. The latter effect always 
prevails. Our empirical analysis, based on repeated cross-section data from 15 European 
countries and 12 industries, confirms the predictions of the model and shows that deregulation 
increases training incidence. 
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Product and labour market deregulation have attracted considerable attention by economists and policy 
makers, and there is a broad concern that these regulations can hamper growth and increase unemployment (see 
e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Alesina et al, 2005). Empirical research on the 
economic effects of product market regulation and deregulation has focused so far on employment (Kugler and 
Pica, 2004), productivity growth (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003, Aghion et al. 2009), investment in capital stock 
(Alesina et al, 2005), innovation (Aghion et al., 2005), and easiness to start a business (Aghion et al, 2008). 
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between product market 
regulation / deregulation and workplace training, which we define as the accumulation of human capital taking 
place while in employment and after school completion. We believe that looking at training is important because 
the production of skills is considered as one of the main factors affecting productivity growth (see e.g. OECD, 
2007). A casual look at available industry-level cross-country data reveals that the degree of stringency of 
product market regulation and the training participation rate are negatively correlated. Using data from the 
European Labour Force Survey and the OECD regulatory database which cover the years 1995-2002, Figure 1 
illustrates  this  for  15  European  countries  and  3  non-manufacturing  sectors  (energy,  transports  and 
communication), for which data are available. Yet the prevailing view in the labour economics literature is that 
product  market  competition  depresses  training  because  it  compresses  the  size  of  the  rents  that  can  be 
appropriated by firms which invest in human capital and pay for most of job-related training (see e.g. Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1999, Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2001, 2006)
1. 
This  view  appears  to  overlook  a  standard  finding  in  the  theory  of  industrial  organization:  a firm’s 
incentives to reduce unit costs - for instance by training more workers - do not depend on the size of rents per se 
but on the sensitivity of rents to unit cost reductions (see e.g. Boone, 2000, and Aghion et al., 1997). In the case 
of price competition (that is when firms set prices rather than quantities), if firms have similar production costs, 
it is well known that greater competition increases incentives to reduce unit costs even if rents – defined in terms 
of profits per unit of output – fall (see e.g. Aghion et al., 2001). This occurs because reducing costs allows 
reducing prices and the sensitivity of product demand to relative prices is greater, the greater the degree of 
competition.  
In this paper we argue that a similar mechanism applies to the investment in human capital by firms, 
insofar as firms pay for training as a mean to reduce unit costs (see e.g. Stevens, 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke, 
1999). We  develop  a  model  which  casts  the  training  decision  in  an  economy  characterized  by  imperfectly 
competitive product and labour markets where firms are ex-ante identical and compete in the product market by 
setting  prices,  as  in  Blanchard  and  Giavazzi  (2003).  We  show  that  in  equilibrium  deregulation  has  two 
contrasting effects on training. On the one hand, a reduction in the barriers to entry for a given number of firms 
compresses profits per unit of output, and therefore tends to depress training (we will call this “rent effect” 
hereafter). This is the mechanism usually stressed in the literature. On the other hand, there is an “elasticity” or 
“business stealing” effect: conditional on profits per unit of output, additional firm entry due to deregulation 
increases the output (and therefore profit) gains from training and raises the employer’s incentive to invest in 
human capital. Output gains increase because additional training reduces the relative product price and the 
response of output to prices is greater, the greater the degree of competition in the product market
2. We show 
that the latter effect prevails on the former and conclude that deregulation increases training.  
We first derive the equilibrium and describe the comparative statics when: a) training is firm – specific 
and paid by firms; and b) wages are the outcome of the bargain between employers and workers. We focus on 
training paid and organized by firms because this is the bulk of workplace training (see Bassanini et al., 2007, 
and the references therein), and on bargaining in line with the importance of collective wage determination in 
                                                 
1 The only exception is Autor (2001) who studies firm-sponsored training in the Temporary Help Sevice (THS) industry. In 
his model training is provided at the time of hiring and is essentially used by THS firms as a screening and selection device. 
Greater product market competition increases the pressure to secure high-ability workers and the need to use training as a 
way to attract and select them. His model therefore appears to be specific to the THS industry. 
2 A similar effect is stressed also by Vives (2006), who investigates the relationship between competition and innovation, 
and Raith (2001), who looks at how competition affects managerial incentives. 2 
 
Europe, to which our empirical analysis applies. Our emphasis on firm – specific training is also motivated by 
the European perspective. In his comparative analysis of labour markets, Wasmer (2006) argues that in Europe 
high employment protection facilitates the investment in firm - specific skills and reduces labour mobility. In the 
US, instead, limited protection favours both the accumulation of more general skills and higher mobility of 
workers.  
 
























Note: The training participation rate refers to training taken in the 4 weeks preceding the survey of full-time employees 
aged between 25 and 54 years and with at least 4 weeks of tenure. The regulation indicator covers all aspects of anti-
competitive regulation (excluding public ownership) and ranges between 0 – no regulation – to 6 – maximum regulation. 
The sector average of each variable has been subtracted to make comparable in a single charts figures from different 
industries. Data refer to averages for 1995-2002 for 3 2-digit (letter) sectors (Energy, Transport and Communications) 
and 15 countries (Norway and pre-enlargement EU excluding Luxembourg). Sources: OECD regulatory database and 
Eurostat's European Labour Force Surveys. 
 
Our key results, however, apply also when training is general and the marginal cost of training is lower 
than the marginal cost of hiring for any value of training, because labour market frictions substantially reduce the 
transferability of general skills, making them de facto specific, as discussed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). 
Moreover, we show that the positive relationship between deregulation and training holds also when training is 
fully general, hiring costs are low, the employee invests and bears the training costs and there is no wage 
bargaining. The reason is that, with additional firm entry due to deregulation, the output gains from employing 
trained workers increase, the demand for training improves, and so does its supply. 
The findings of the theoretical model are a useful guide to our empirical research. Empirical work on 
product market competition and training is scarce. We are aware of only two studies on the issue and both point 
to a positive relationship between competition and training. Autor (2001), shows that the Herfindhal index and 
training are negatively correlated in US temporary help firms, which suggests that less competition reduces 
training. In a multi-country study of Europe, Bassanini et al (2007), find evidence of a negative and statistically 3 
 
significant correlation between the index of product market regulation developed by the OECD and training 
intensity, thereby supporting and generalizing Autor's findings. 
One potential drawback of multi-country aggregate studies is that, by exploiting only the country and 
time dimensions, they do not allow to control for many confounding factors that might affect training and vary 
across country and over time. One way to overcome this limit is to add at least one additional dimension to the 
data, the sector, as we do in the current paper. With data which vary by country, year and sector, we can compare 
a treatment group, which consists of the sectors directly affected by our measure of deregulation, with a control 
group, composed of those sectors which are not affected directly by such measure, while at the same time 
controlling for country and country by time specific effects. The assignment to sectors is random insofar as we 
can safely rule out the possibility that firms anticipating policy reform can switch sector of production. Given the 
costs of switching sector, we believe that this source of endogeneity is of second order of relevance.  
We use the OECD database on product market regulation which has been designed to pick up regulatory 
reforms in traditionally heavily regulated sectors, such as transport, communication and public utilities. We 
consider these sectors as our treatment group, and contrast their behaviour with respect to training with the 
control group, which consists of the manufacturing sector, limiting our analysis to European countries. After the 
implementation of the European Single Market Programme (SMP hereafter) in the early 1990s, we can assume 
that no country/sector-specific regulatory reform affected the manufacturing sector, which therefore qualifies as 
a  genuine  control.
3  By  comparing  training  incidence  in  these  sectors,  we  try  to  disentangle  the  effects  of 
deregulation on training from other confounding factors, which affect both groups. To this purpose we match 
regulation data with training data from the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) as well as several other 
sector-level databases and obtain a rich sector-level database of training covariates. 
Our econometric analysis shows that reducing product market regulation increases training incidence, in 
line with the predictions of the theoretical model
4. The estimated effects are not small: depending on the selected 
measure of regulation and on the empirical specification, a 10 percent reduction of regulation increases training 
incidence in the exposed industries by 2.8 to 5 percent.  
One  might  question  whether  the  OECD  indicators  can  adequately  capture  the  regulation  and 
deregulation  processes  taking  place  in  the  treated  industries.  If  yes,  we  would  expect  these  indicators  to 
positively affect industry–specific profitability. We show that this is the case when profitability is measured by 
the observed Lerner index (defined as the average share of the value of output that exceeds variable costs, see 
e.g. Klette, 1999). We also decompose the marginal effect of deregulation on training incidence into its negative 
effect on the Lerner index and the marginal effect of a lower Lerner index on training, and show that the former 
is negative and the latter is positive – lower profits are associated to lower rents but also to a higher number of 
firms, and the overall effect on deregulation on training is positive.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we develop the theoretical model. The subsequent 
sections introduce the empirical strategy and the data and present our estimates of the relationship between 
training and product market regulation. Conclusions follow. 
 
1. The Model 
 
1.1 Firm-specific training and wage bargaining 
 
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Stevens (1996), consider a three–stage model economy 
where each firm produces a differentiated product using labour. The number of firms  m  is determined by an 
entry condition, which is affected by product market regulation. The logical sequence of the model is as follows: 
first, firms decide entry (let us call this stage zero); second, each firm hires a number of (unskilled) workers and 
provides them with a given amount of training, paying the related training costs (call this first stage); third, and 
                                                 
3 The manufacturing sector, however, could be affected indirectly, because of the close linkage among sectors typical of 
modern economies. 
4 Needless to say, our empirical results can be consistent with alternative theoretical constructs. In this paper, we do not 
attempt to discriminate our theory against alternative hypotheses. More modestly, we develop a theoretical model which is 
consistent with the empirical findings. 4 
 
conditional on training, firms and workers bargain over wages and employment – or over wages only if the 
employer  (credibly)  commits  to  employ  all  trainees  in  final  production  –  (call  it  second  or  final  stage).
5 
Conditional on the amount of training, prices are set when employment is determined. Production occurs at the 
end of the sequence.  
As standard in the training literature (see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, Stevens (1996) or Bassanini 
et al., 2007), we assume that no training can occur after the bargaining. In both the decision to enter and in the 
choice of how many workers to train, each employer has full information and can perfectly foresee the wages 
she will pay, the level of employment and the prices at which she will be able to sell her goods. 
Firms in this economy share the same production and training technology, and the same elasticity of 
product  demand.  Risk  neutral  homogeneous  workers  have  the  same  reservation  wage,  and  there  are  no 
exogenous separations of workers from firms. Furthermore, imparted skills are firm–specific (an assumption that 
we relax in sub-section 1.2).
6 Each firm operates the technology  i
e
i AL Y = , where  i Y  is output of firm i,  A is a 
productivity parameter and  i
e L  is employment in efficiency units, which depends on the amount of training 
given to each employee  0 ≥ i τ . Hereafter, we shall call this amount “training intensity”. We assume that the 
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where µ is a scale parameter. This assumption captures decreasing returns in the production of human capital and 
rules out corner solutions for optimal training.
7 Training affects productivity and labour in efficiency units is 
given  by  i i i
e L L ) 1 ( τ + =   where  L  is  employment.  Hence,  the  production  function  can  be  written  as 
. ) 1 ( i i i L A Y τ + =
8 Since the number of employees cannot be greater than the number of workers recruited and 
trained in the first stage  i T , it must be that i i T L ≤ . 
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where  1 ) ( > = m g σ θ  is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price, which 






9, σ is a suitable constant, Y  is aggregate output, and  i P  and  P  are 
the price set by firm i and the average price respectively.  
                                                 
5 Our results can be easily generalised to the case where workers have no bargaining power and are paid their reservation 
wage. 
6 The assumption is less restrictive than one might think insofar as each firm might have an idiosyncratic combination of 
general skills (see e.g. Lazear, 2003). 
7 Decreasing returns can arise for instance because the marginal productivity of trainers is decreasing in training intensity. 
8 We implicitly assume that the employees of firm i have the same level of skills, and that the employer cannot gain by 
recruiting both trained and untrained workers. We also assume that each unit of training increases the efficiency of labour 
by one unit. This is just a normalisation that simplifies the analysis with no qualitative impact on results. 
9 This follows from the fact that an increase in the number of products associated to firm entry raises the elasticity of 
substitution between products. As standard in this type of models, we also assume that the number of firms is sufficiently 
large that the firm cannot affect aggregate variables with its own decisions. This is one of the key differences between our 
model and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2001, 2006) who consider strategic interactions in a duopoly (with no entry). 5 
 
  Define net and gross profits as net and gross of training costs. The characterization of the equilibrium 
proceeds  by  backward  induction  and  starts  with  the  bargain  in  the  second  and  final  stage.  Ex-post  wage 
bargaining is justified by the fact that, when firms invest in firm–specific training, workers cannot commit to ex-
ante wages but re-contract after the training investment has taken place (Malcolmson, 1997). It is also a plausible 
characterization  of  European  labour  markets,  where  wages  are  often  set  by  collective  bargaining  between 
employers and trade unions (see Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 2005).  
In the event of settlement, employed workers earn  V W ≥ , where V is the reservation wage. Failure to 
settle disrupts the production process to the point that no production occurs and the parties agree to separate. In 
this event the firm makes zero profits and workers earn their reservation wage V. We characterize the bargaining 
as a cooperative Nash game, and define the Nash maximand as  
 
[ ] [ ] i i i i i i i W L Y P L V W − − + − = Ω ln ) 1 ( ) ( ln δ δ              [3] 
 
where  1 ≤ δ  is the relative bargaining power of labour and the second element on the right hand side of [3] is 
the gross nominal profit from a positive settlement accruing to the employer
10.  
  Consider two alternative settings: in one setting, each firm either can credibly commit to employ in the 
second stage all the workers who were trained in the first stage – or is forced to do that by strict dismissal 
regulations. In these circumstances, second–stage employment is fixed and the parties bargain only over wages. 
In the other setting, there is no strict regulation and the employer does not commit to employ all trainees. As a 
consequence, in the second stage both wages and employment are bargained over, subject to the constraint that 
the number of employees cannot exceed the number of trainees set in the first stage
11. We start with describing 
the equilibrium under the former setting (call it the “commitment equilibrium”). We do so for expositional 
reasons, since the derivation of the equilibrium is simple and more intuitive in this setting. We then show that the 
same equilibrium also holds and is unique in the absence of commitment. We conclude this sub-section by 
stating the key testable implication on the relationship between product market deregulation and firm-specific 
training. In the next sub-section we show that the same key implication holds also in the case of general training. 
 
1.1.1  The commitment case 
 
With employment equal to the number of trainees, the parties in the second stage bargain over wages to 
maximise equation [3]. The outcome of the bargain in firm i is 
 
  ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( V A P V V
L
Y
P W i i
i
i
i i − + + = − + = τ δ δ δ             [4] 
 
Each employee is paid the outside option plus a share of total rents per worker, a standard result. Employer i in 
the first stage internalises the wage rule [4] and chooses training intensity and the number of trainees (and 
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10 Profits are gross because training costs in the second stage are bygones. 
11 We assume that in this case the parties are involved in efficient bargaining. An alternative characterization would be the 
“right to manage” model, where the employer retains authority over employment determination. We follow Blanchard and 
Giavazzi in the preference for efficient bargaining, which they argue has the advantage of capturing the possibility that 
firms are not operating on their demand for labour. 
12 That is, nominal profits divided by the average price. 6 
 
The terms within and outside the braces on the right-hand side are net real profits per unit of output  i π  and 
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The relative product price of firm i is a mark-up on the sum of unit labour costs 
) 1 ( i PA
V
τ +
 - net of the share of 
rents accruing to workers - and unit training costs 







, with the latter component increased by  the factor 
(1/(1-δ)).
13  
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Substituting [6] into [7] and simplifying gives the following second order equation in training intensity 
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which can be solved to yield 
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Since both V and the parameters µ and δ do not vary across firms, it must be that  τ τ = i , implying that all firms 
select the same training intensity for their employees. It follows from this and equation [6] that, at the optimal 
level of training, relative prices are the same across firms. Since in general equilibrium we cannot have that all 
firms have a relative price above or below 1 (see Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003), it must be that  P
i P  is equal to 
1. Using this result into [7] we obtain the key expression 
 
                                                 
13 This is due to the fact that training benefits are shared but training costs are borne only by the firm. If workers have no 
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which shows that training intensity in equilibrium is an increasing function of the elasticity of demand θ  and, 
therefore, the number of firms m. To better explain this result, we use equation [6] and the fact that relative 
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which plugged into [9] yields 
 




                      [11] 
 
Training  intensity  is  increasing  in  net  real  profits  per  unit  of  output  π   and,  conditional  on  π ,  is 
decreasing in the training cost parameter  µ  and increasing in the productivity parameter A as well as in the 
elasticity θ . The relationship between training intensity and θ reflects both a “rent” and a “business stealing” 
effect. The former effect has negative sign and occurs because an increase in θ reduces profits per unit of output 
π and the benefits of training. The latter effect has positive sign and comes from the fact that the output (and 
profit) gains from training are increasing in θ: training increases productivity, relative prices are decreasing in 
productivity and the response of output to relative prices is greater, the higher is θ. It turns out that the latter 
effect always dominates the former. Therefore, more product market competition that increases the number of 
firms and elasticity θ unambiguously increases training intensity in equilibrium, as shown by equation [9]. 
  In the long-run, the equilibrium number of firms is determined by the condition that net profits per unit 









                     [12] 
 
The assumption that ρ is proportional to output is convenient and used also by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). 
We show in the Appendix that our results still hold when we specify the entry cost more conventionally as a 
fixed cost. Equation [12] implies that a fall in the costs of entry increases the number of firms and θ. As a 
consequence, profits per unit of output are reduced until the arbitrage condition [12] is satisfied. We assume that 
ρ  can  be taken as exogenous  or  determined  by  public  policy.  A reduction in  ρ   can  be  brought  about  by 
liberalisation reforms lowering regulatory barriers in the product market. For instance, we can assume that 
) (R f = ρ , where R measures the stringency of regulatory barriers and  0 / > ∂ ∂ R f .  




τ ) 1 ( − =
A
                     [13] 
 
which, taking into account the relationship between θ  and ρ  described by equation [12], yields: 
 
) 1 ( ρ δ
µ
τ − − =
A
                    [14] 
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where  δ ρ − <1  because  1 > θ . We summarise our results in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1. In the commitment case, the long run equilibrium in the presence of positive entry costs ρ exists 
and is unique. A reduction in entry barriers – which corresponds to a reduction in the parameter ρ – increases 
training intensity. 
 
  In comparative statics terms, the effect of product market deregulation on training intensity is illustrated 
in Figure 2, where continuous lines in the ( ) τ θ,  plane refer to the initial equilibrium and dashed lines to the new 
equilibrium. Training intensity along the schedule TT – associated to equation [13] – tends to zero when  1 → θ  
and increases with θ and the number of firms
14. The schedule MM associated to equation [12] is a vertical line, 
which  simply  describes  the  relationship  between  entry  costs  and  the  number  of  firms.  This  line  cuts  the 







>1. Therefore, the two schedules certainly intersect (existence of equilibrium) and 






Figure 2: The effect of reducing barriers to entry in the commitment case 
 
A product market deregulation which reduces entry barriers and the value of ρ shifts the MM curve 
outwards and the TT curve downwards. The overall effect is to increase the number of firms unambiguously. 
There are two effects on training intensity: first, and for a given number of firms, lower entry barriers rotate the 
                                                 











.  9 
 
TT schedule downwards,
15 because they imply lower net profits per unit of output, thereby dampening training 
intensity. This is the “rent” effect usually stressed in the literature. Second, the number of firms in equilibrium is 
higher and the MM shifts outwards. Training increases along the new TT schedule, because the output gains 
from  training  are  greater  (the  “business  stealing”  effect).  Since  the  latter  effect  is  larger  than  the  former, 
equilibrium training intensity increases. 
 
1.1.2  The no-commitment case 
 
In this sub-section we argue that the commitment equilibrium described above is an equilibrium even in 
the  absence  of  commitment.  Our  argument  here  is  only  verbal,  but  the  formal  proofs  are  available  in  the 
Appendix. We proceed in two steps, which correspond to the two lemmas presented in the Appendix. First we 
show that, starting from the commitment equilibrium, bargaining outcomes involving any employer and her 
workers cannot produce a level of employment  i L  that differs from the equilibrium number of trainees  i T . On 
the one hand,  i i T L <  is not a profitable deviation from the equilibrium: if the bargaining pair were free to 
deviate, it would bargain for  i i T L > . The intuitive reason is that, in the second stage, the employer and her 
workers bargain over employment without internalising training costs, which are bygones and do not affect the 
Nash maximand (cf. equation [3]). By contrast, as shown in the previous subsection,  i T  is set in the first stage by 
taking into account those costs – that are increasing in  i T . On the other hand,  i i T L >  is not feasible because 
training is only possible in the first stage, and there is no available skilled worker who can be hired in the labour 
market. Therefore, training in the first stage acts as an effective commitment device. 
Second, let us define an “accommodating strategy” as a strategy that selects in the first stage a training 
intensity  i τ  and a number of trainees  i T  which accommodates the level of employment that each firm i expects 
to be chosen by the bargaining parties in the second stage if they could bargain over wages and employment 
without any constraint. We show that this strategy is always less profitable than a non accommodating strategy, 
which sets a relatively low number of trainees in the first stage and by so doing binds employment in the second 
stage to the constraint  i i T L = . The intuition here is that, in the absence of commitment, the level of employment 
set by bargaining parties in the second stage tends to be “too high” because, as discussed above, the employer 
and  her  workers  bargain  over  employment  in  the  second  stage  without  internalising  training  costs.  By 
accommodating this employment level in the first stage, the employer is forced to bear the associated training 
costs. A natural way to reduce these costs is to tie her own hands and train a smaller number of workers in the 
first stage, thereby constraining employment in the second stage. 
Since  the  bargaining  parties  cannot  profitably  deviate  in  the  second  stage  from  the  commitment 
equilibrium, and no single firm can profitably pursue an accommodating strategy that allows employment to be 
freely chosen in the second stage, employment is effectively constrained to be equal to the ex-ante number of 
trainees even in the absence of commitment, and the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 2. In the presence of positive entry costs ρ, and given the workers’ bargaining power δ, the cost 
parameter  µ  and the productivity parameter A, a combination of training intensity τ , number of trainees T , 
wages W  and employment  L  that is an equilibrium in the commitment case is also the unique equilibrium in 
the no-commitment case.  
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
In the extreme case when  0 = ρ  and the number of firms goes to infinity, there are no rents, which 
implies no scope for business stealing effects because firms cannot trade off lower profits per unit of output for 
                                                 
15 The barycentre of the rotation is the point (1,0). 
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greater output. Therefore, equilibrium training is zero. The case of no entry costs looks, however, implausible 
and, at best, applies to a relatively small number of specific markets.
16 Hence, we can establish the following 
corollary, which yields a testable implication and provides an explanation for the empirical pattern shown in 
Figure 1: 
 
Corollary 1. A reduction in entry barriers – corresponding to a reduction in the parameter ρ – that does not lead 
to perfect competition in the product markets increases firm-specific training incidence independently of whether 
employers can or cannot commit to a given employment level. 
 
1.2  General training 
 
In the economy described so far, each firm invests in firm – specific training and is willing to pay the 
necessary training costs. Moreover, workers and employers bargain over wages and employment. As already 
stressed, we believe that the emphasis on bargaining and specific training is justified by the fact that our data 
come from European countries. However, we would like to know whether our results are more general and apply 
also to other economies where collective bargaining plays a minor role and/or training tends to be more general. 
In this sub-section, we consider an alternative specification of the model where firm-specific training is replaced 
by general training, and the wage of trained workers is also determined by the interaction of demand and supply. 
Assume that skills are general and that firms have the option of hiring skilled labour from the labour 
market or from other firms (poaching). With firm-specific skills, no trained worker is available in the market. If 
training is general, however, workers can be trained by one firm and switch employer in the second-stage if there 
are employers willing to offer them a higher wage. If hiring were costless and hired workers were as productive 
as workers trained in-house, no firm would be willing to train and bear the training costs.
17 However, hiring 
skilled  labour  in  an  imperfectly  competitive  labour  market  is  costly,  either  because  skills  are  not  fully 
transferable or because of the presence of frictions and information asymmetries. For example, the recruitment 
of skilled labour requires a costly screening activity – both in terms of time and resources – to distinguish 
between skilled and unskilled applicants and to measure the skills of potential hires. Since the cost of screening 








τ = , where η is a non-negative scale parameter. 
When the marginal cost of training is lower than the marginal cost of hiring, the analysis in Section 1.1 
applies. In this case, the employer’s willingness to pay for training is justified because labour market frictions – 
including search and informational asymmetries – substantially reduce the transferability of general skills from a 
firm to another, as discussed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).  
Consider next the case when hiring is less costly than training. With no heterogeneity in the technology 
and in the costs of hiring and training, all firms prefer to hire skilled labour than train unskilled labour. But with 
                                                 
16 For example, when we use the time-varying data on which Figure 1 is based, in only 3% of the available observations the 
indicator  of  industry-specific  regulatory  barriers  to  competition  is  equal  to  zero.  This  would  imply  that,  in  our  data, 
competition was not perfect in at least 97% of the observations (and probably in fewer of them, since absence of anti-
competitive regulation is only a necessary condition for perfect competition). 
17 As shown by Gersbach and Schmutzler (2001), this statement may not hold if the number of firms in the market is small 
(and fixed), so that aggregate variables cannot be taken as given by the firm – as it happens in our model - because they are 
affected by its own behaviour. In their model, the marginal productivity of training is a decreasing function of training, the 
number of firms is small and entry is not possible. Therefore, even with no hiring costs, each firm is able to keep at least a 
fraction of its own trained workers, even if all other firms do not train and prefer to poach. This occurs because the firm’s 
marginal benefit from employing skilled workers is decreasing in the employment level, which implies that each firm will 
employ an equal number of skilled workers. The share of workers trained in-house that the firm will be able to keep will be 
therefore at least 1/m, where m is small and fixed. As competition dampens the sensitivity of the firm’s marginal benefit 
from employing skilled workers to employment, this type of model implies that competition reduces training investment by 
firms. By contrast, in a standard model of monopolistic competition, such as ours, in which the number of firms is assumed 
to be large, essentially all workers can be poached, and this effect is always neutralised. 11 
 
no training by firms there can be no hiring of skilled labour, unless workers themselves are willing to bear the 
training costs. For each worker, let the cost of training be 
2
2 ξτ
 and assume that wages are a function of training 
intensity,  ) (τ W W =
18. Then homogeneous workers will invest until the marginal benefit of the investment is 
equal to the marginal cost 
 
ξτ τ = ) ( ' W                              [15] 
 
where the prime is for the first derivative.  
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where we have imposed the equilibrium condition  1 =
P
P i . Using [15] in [16] we obtain that training is given by 
 












1                     [17] 
 
where θ is a negative function of entry costs per unit of output ρ. The above equation indicates that, when 
workers invest in general skills, a deregulation of the product market which raises the number of firms and the 
elasticity of product demand θ generates higher training intensity because it increases the marginal benefits of 











 accruing to firms and, therefore, the demand for better trained workers. As in 
the previous subsection, this occurs because more training reduces relative prices and the sensitivity of output 
(and  profits)  to  prices  is greater,  the  greater the  elasticity  of  product  demand.  Higher  demand  for  training 
generates in turn higher wages for trained labour, and a higher supply of skills.
20 Proceeding as in the section 1.1 
– that is, taking into account the entry condition, the first-order conditions with respect to employment and the 
symmetry of prices – we obtain that  ρ θ / 1 = , which used in [17] yields: 
 






                    [18] 
                                                 
18 In the symmetric equilibrium, employment in each firm is given by 




L . Notice that the marginal cost of 
training for the worker should not be confused with equation [1], which refers to the employer. 
19 Since firms are homogeneous, we drop the subscript i. 
20 Subject to the assumption of small hiring costs, our model is close to the model developed by Gaudalupe (2007) to 
explain the effect of product market deregulation on skill premia in the United Kingdom.  12 
 
 
  We conclude from this that Corollary 1 holds independently of the fact that training is specific or 
general.  Therefore,  any  empirical  evidence  showing  that  anti-competitive  regulation  reduces  training  is 
consistent both with the situation described in sub-section 1.1, where firms train and bear the training costs and 
wages are set by bargaining,
21 and with an alternative setting with no bargaining where workers bear the training 
costs and firms hire skilled labour from the market.  
 
 
2. The Empirical Model 
 
In the empirical application, we investigate whether changes in regulation affect training, measured in 
our data as the proportion TP of workers receiving training during a defined period of time. This measure gives 
us an indication of the proportion of time an average worker spends being trained.
22 If the quantity of training 
depends solely on the time spent on it, and workers are homogeneous, the measure TP is also proportional to the 
amount of training given to every worker, the variable used in the theoretical model.
23 Equations [14] in the case 
of firm specific training and [18] in the case of general training generate a map from entry costs  ρ  to training 
intensity  τ ,  and  therefore  TP.  To  the  extent  that  the relationship  between  entry  costsρ and  the  degree  of 
stringency of regulatory barriers is monotonic, this map is also from regulatory barriers R to training TP, and in 
the absence of data on entry costs but with information on regulation we can estimate the relationship between R 
and TP.   
Alternatively, since in the long-run equilibrium entry costs are equal to (net) real profits per unit of 
output, we can use a measure of profitability, such as the Lerner index, to proxy entry costs. In this case, the 
relationship between deregulation and training consists of two components: the effect of profitability on training 
and  the  effect  of  product  market  regulation  on  profitability  (entry  costs).  However,  the  problem  with  any 
measure of profitability is that it is endogenous, as productivity shocks which affect training also influence 
profits. Fortunately, and letting aside political economy considerations, entry regulation can be assumed to be 
exogenous and to affect training only through profitability so that the degree of stringency of regulatory barriers 
can be used as an instrument for the measure of profitability.
24 
Our regulatory indicators and profitability measures vary by sector, country and over time. Therefore, 
we collapse our data on training and additional controls at the same level of aggregation and estimate the 
following empirical counterpart of the theoretical model: 
 
ict ict ict ict Y X TP ε λ λ λ + + + = 2 1 0           [19] 
 
where  X  is a vector of controls, which includes average age, education and firm size, Y  is the selected measure 
of regulation or profitability, the subscript i  is for the industry, c is for the country and t  is for time.  
The  linear  specification  in  [19]  can  be  problematic  when  the  dependent  variable  is  fractional  (see 
Wooldridge, 2001). Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we assume that the conditional mean is an inverse 
logit function G of the independent variables and consider the following transformed generalized linear model 
                                                 
21 Or, with no bargaining power, workers are paid their outside option. 
22 Bassanini et al. (2007), for example, show that there is a very strong correlation between the proportion of employees that 
are trained in a given year and average hours of training per employee. 
23  In  a  previous  version  of  this  paper  (Bassanini  and  Brunello,  2007),  we  explicitly  distinguish  between  trained  and 
untrained workers in the theoretical model. In that case, training is defined as a 0-1 event both in the theoretical and in the 
empirical  application,  and  its  intensity  is  measured  by  the  participation  rate.  Theoretical  results  are  similar  to  those 
discussed in the current version, at the price of greater complexity.  
24 Regulation might be endogenous if deregulation tends to occur where productivity growth or innovation are greater and 
training is correlated with these variables (see e.g. Duso and Röller, 2003). Although we believe that this is unlikely to 
seriously affect estimates,  we partially control for this channel by adding to  some of our  specifications, as additional 
covariates, R&D intensity, productivity levels and growth and the investment rate. 13 
 
(GLM) as an alternative to [19]:  
 
( ) ict ict ict ict Y X G TP ε λ λ λ + + + = 2 1 0                 [20] 
 
that we estimate using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE), where the quasi-likelihood function is 
the binary choice log likelihood.
25 We postulate that the error term is as follows 
 
ict ct it ic ict ω ξ ξ ξ ε + + + =  
 
where  ic ξ  is a country by industry effect,  it ξ  is an industry by time effect,  ct ξ  is a country by time effect, and 
ict ω  is a standard disturbance. We control for these unobserved effects by including in the specification country 
by sector, country by year, and sector by year dummies. The country by sector dummies capture cross country 
differences in the structure of each industry, including differences in the parameters σ, δ and A; the sector by 
year effects capture the time varying differences in trend growth between affected industries (treated group) and 
industries not affected directly by deregulation (control group); the country by year dummies absorb country-
specific  macroeconomic  effects,  country-wide  changes  in  policy  (notably  training  policy  and  nation-wide 
regulation, on which we have no data - see below) as well as changes in the routing of the questionnaire and/or 
the exact formulation of the training question. 
Our key interest lies in estimating the coefficient  2 λ , which measures the relationship between product 
market regulation and training. A negative estimate of  2 λ  would suggest that a negative relationship between 
regulation and training prevails, consistent with the theoretical model of section 1. One might argue, however, 
that the training concept developed in the model corresponds to steady state training stocks, while we have 
specified our empirical model in terms of training flows. Although this argument is questionable, we can observe 
that, given that training stocks and training flows are likely to be positively correlated, the model can be re-
specified in terms of the training stock TS by simply substituting it for TP in equation [19]. In a sensitivity 
analysis, we construct training stocks from training flows by following a methodology similar to Conti (2005) 
and Dearden et al. (2006). In particular, we assume a common depreciation rate ( 15 . 0 = β ) and a steady state 
rate of training growth  g  equal to the sample average growth rate of training flows,
26 and reconstruct initial 
conditions under the assumption that steady state growth occurs at the beginning of the sample, which implies 
0 1 ) /( TS g TP = + β , where TP1 is the training flow in the first period and TS0 the training stock in the initial 
period. Finally, training stocks after missing years are constructed by assuming steady state growth in those 
years. 
  Specifications  [19]  and  [20]  assume  that,  conditional  on  the  vector  X,  product  market  regulation 
variables are the only institutional variables that can vary by country, year and sector, and that institutional 
confounding factors are fully accounted for by the combination of country by year, country by sector and sector 
by year dummies. While this is plausible, we cannot rule out the possibility that variables measuring labour 
market institutions at the same level of detail as regulation variables do affect training. If this is so, failure to 
account for these effects could erroneously attribute them to changes in product market regulation. Therefore, we 
                                                 
25 Papke and Wooldridge (1996) show that QMLE estimators of this kind  yield consistent estimates of equation [20] 
independently of any assumption on the error term, for which a robust variance estimator can be easily devised. In addition, 
in contrast to the more classical WLS estimation of a linear model with log-odds transformation of the dependent variable, 
the  GLM  specification  does  not  require  adjustment  for  boundary  values  (such  as  zeros)  and  can  be  estimated  when 
fractional data are obtained by sample averages in samples of unknown size that cannot therefore be used to construct 
weights, as is our case.  
 
26 In the steady state, flows and stocks grow at the same rate. In country/sector units where a decrease of training flows is 
observed, the steady state growth rate is set to zero. Alternative measures of training stocks are discussed in Section 4. 
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We use three main sources of data: a) an OECD database on training and other labour market variables; 
b)  OECD  regulatory  indicators  for  seven  non-manufacturing  industries  (electricity,  gas,  air  transport,  road 
transport, railways, post and telecommunications); c) additional sector-level information on output, physical 
capital  and  other  controls  available  in  the  OECD  STAN  Family  databases  and  the  companion  60-industry 
database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.  
The OECD database on training is drawn from the EU Labour Force Surveys. It contains information on 
training  and  a  number  labour  market  variables  (namely  age,  gender,  education,  part-time/full-time  status, 
occupation, industry, firm-size, tenure, whether the contract is temporary or permanent, whether the activity is in 
the country of residence, participation in training, type of training and training duration) for employed workers 
of 23 European countries from 1995 to 2002 (with many missing values, corresponding to countries and years 
where questions on training were not administered or data on training are unreliable). Data have been collected 
in the second quarter of each year (March in most countries). Quantitative variables (such as tenure or firm size) 
are divided into categories (see the appendix for more details). As regards to age, we dispose of categories 
covering five-year intervals, but reconstruct an ordinal variable by applying to all observations in each category 
the mean age of the category. Data are semi-aggregated insofar as organized by cells. Each cell corresponds to a 
combination  of  categories.  Available  cells  cover  all  non-empty  combinations  with  one  category  for  each 
variable. Population weights are reported for each cell.  
Training data refer to participation in any education or training course in the 4 weeks preceding the 
interview (1 week for France). Information on the type of training and its length is available but often missing. 
For this reason, we do not use it. In order to avoid that initial and close-to-retirement education confound the 
information on workplace training, we limit our analysis to full-time employees with at least 1 month of tenure, 
aged between 25 and 54 years, and working in their country of residence. Descriptive statistics on training are 
available in the Appendix. 
We collapse our data on training and selected other labour market variables (education, age, gender and 
firm size) at the level of sectors. Industries are available at the 2 digit level of the NACE rev.1 classification
27 for 
most countries and years in manufacturing. In services, they are available at a slightly more disaggregated level 
than 1 digit of NACE rev. 1. However, since only NACE 1970 is available for certain country-year pairs, we are 
obliged to aggregate a few industries in order to construct our sector-level database. The final list of industries is 
available in the Appendix. 
We have access to detailed OECD indicators of anti-competitive product market regulation in seven 2 or 
3 digit non-manufacturing industries. Data are available for 21 OECD countries on an annual basis and span 
from 1975 to 2003. These indicators refer to sector-specific entry barriers, public ownership, the market share of 
the dominant player(s) when relevant (in the telephone, gas and railroad sectors), vertical integration in network 
industries and price controls when relevant (in the road freight industry). Outside the scope of these indicators 
are  nation-wide  aspects  of  regulations  applying  to  all  industries,  such  as  administrative  barriers  to 
entrepreneurship (administrative barriers on start-ups, general features of the licensing and permit system, etc...), 
since these data are not available in time-series in the OECD database. 
Available indicators vary between 0 and 6 from the least to the most regulated. Entry barriers cover legal 
limitations on the number of companies and rules on vertical integration of network industries. A value of 0 
corresponds to free entry. By contrast, a value of 6 applies when entry is severely restricted. Public ownership 
measures the share of equity owned by central or municipal governments, and takes a value of 0 in the case of no 
equity and a value of 6 in the case of full ownership. All other indicators are similarly defined
28.  
Following Alesina et al. (2005) we use the available information to construct time-series indicators of 
                                                 
27 At the 2 digit level, this classification corresponds to the ISIC rev. 3, with extremely few exceptions. 
28 More details on these indicators are available from Nicoletti et al. (2001), Alesina et al. (2005) and Conway and Nicoletti 
(2006). 15 
 
regulatory barriers for three aggregate industries (utilities, transport, and communication services), for which we 
have  training  data.  This  method  involves  two  steps.  First,  separate  indicators  of  barriers  to  entry,  public 
ownership, market structure, vertical integration and price controls for each of the seven industries are averaged 
to  obtain  two  coarser  (and  partially  alternative)  indicators:  BEVI,  which  summarizes  barriers  to  entry 
(comprising legal restrictions and vertical integration) and REGNO, which includes all dimensions except public 
ownership. As our model applies explicitly to barriers to entry we expect BEVI to be related to training. The 
same  might  apply  to  REGNO  insofar  as  the  presence  of  price  controls  and  the  absence  of  barriers  to 
concentration can, to a certain extent, be seen as additional barriers to start-ups. Second, the same indicators for 
the three more aggregated industries are obtained by simple averaging the values of the corresponding sub-
industries. 
Once the two indicators of regulation are matched to our training data we obtain 309 country by sector 
by  time  non-missing  observations  concerning  three (typically  regulated)  service  industries  for  15  European 
countries and a maximum of 8 years.
29 Yet, these industries account for a small share of total employment (about 
7.5% in 2002). Moreover, in the event that reforms in these three sectors have occurred almost simultaneously, 
the effect of the variation in regulation on training incidence risks to be swept away once country per year 
dummies are included in the empirical analysis.  
To  circumvent  this  problem,  we  add  manufacturing  industries  to  our  dataset.  For  these  industries, 
regulation concerns essentially administrative burdens, limitations to foreign direct investment as well as barriers 
to trade, at least in European countries. Now, only the last two barriers can be considered to be sector-specific. 
But for them, due to the coming into action of the Single Market Programme (SMP) in 1992, it can be assumed 
that their time profile is flat since at least 1994 for the 12 countries that were EU members in 1992 (see e.g. 
Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2001).
30 The same argument can be applied to Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
from 1995 (see e.g. Baldwin et al., 1996, and Gullstrand and Johansson, 2005).
31 This is equivalent to assume 
that – since 1994 for the majority of countries and since 1995 for a few countries - regulation in manufacturing 
has been equal to an arbitrary constant, which we control for with country by industry dummies. In sum, we 
construct an extended dataset starting from the three non-manufacturing industries by adding manufacturing and 
including only post-SMP years. In practice, this is equivalent to using a difference in difference estimator, where 
manufacturing sectors are used as the control group and services are the treated group. We end up with a sample 
composed of 15 countries and 12 industries for a maximum of 8 years for each country-industry pair, and for a 
total of 1236 observations once observations with missing information on training is excluded. 
We consider also the observed Lerner index as a measure of unit profitability in real terms. In our data 
the Lerner index L is defined as the difference between the value of output and total intermediate, labour and 
capital costs, normalised by the value of output.
32 All the relevant data, except interest rates, are from the OECD 
STAN database (current and previous versions).
33 Following Griffith et al. (2006), we calculate the cost of 
capital by assuming that capital flows freely across borders so that all countries face a world interest rate, for 
                                                 
29 Since the exact month of each regulatory reform is not known and might well be subsequent to the second quarter of the 
corresponding year, each regulatory indicator is lagged one year. 
30Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) report that, on average, 75% of the measures implied by the SMP agreement were already 
transposed into national legal systems at the time when the SMP came into action, and that virtually all measures were 
transposed shortly after. 
31 According to the first editions of the Single Market Scoreboard (EC, 1997, 1998), by 1997 Finland, Norway and Sweden 
were among the best performing countries as far as transposition of EC directives is concerned. Only Austria appeared to 
lag behind, but its gap with other EU countries was closed in 1998. For this reason we check that our results are robust to 
exclusion of Austria prior to 1998.  
32 This computed index is equivalent to the price-cost margin under the assumption of perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale (see Klette, 1999, for a discussion). In principle, violation of these assumptions might induce biases, and 
estimations from production or cost functions would be desirable. Yet, estimated mark-up cannot vary simultaneously by 
country,  industry  and  year.  In  addition,  our  Lerner  index  will  be  treated  as  an  endogenous  variable  and  instrumental 
variables will deal with the possibility of systematic measurement error. For these reasons we prefer to follow Aghion et al. 
(2005) and use a computed Lerner index.  
33 Capital stocks in nominal terms are obtained by multiplying nominal value added by the ratio of capital stock in volume 
terms obtained through perpetual inventory method and value added in volume terms.  16 
 
which we use the US long-term interest rate taken from the OECD EO Database
34.  
The other additional relevant covariates are taken from the OECD STAN and related databases. First, 
one can imagine that growing businesses will have a greater propensity to train than downsizing businesses, 
insofar as in the former the proportion of new hires in need of induction training is likely to be greater,
35 and in 
the latter the proportion of dismissals, upon which employers will be unable to recoup the cost of training, is 
higher. To control for this we include the logarithm of employment growth. Second, there are good reasons to 
think that training might vary over the business-cycle. For instance, according to Hall (2000), re-organisations 
take place during slack periods when the cost of foregoing production to re-allocate resources is smaller. The 
case studied by Hall concerns creation/destruction of job matches and search. However, it can well apply to 
internal  re-organization,  which  usually  requires  long  periods  of  adaptation,  learning  and  training  before 
becoming again fully efficient (see also Jovanovic, 2006). In support of such a view, Sepulveda (2002) finds that 
on-the-job  training  is  counter-cyclical  using  data  from  the  US  National  Longitudinal  Survey  of  Youth.  To 
control for sector-specific business cycles we construct log worked hours gaps by subtracting to this variable its 
filtered time-series obtained applying an Hodrick-Prescott filter with standard parameters. Third, we include the 
logarithm of R&D intensity, which we expect to affect the incentives to train.
36 Finally, one might expect that, 
particularly  in  certain  manufacturing  industries,  globalisation  is  increasing  the  competitive  pressure  on 
businesses,  particularly  to  improve  production  quality,  independently  of  regulation.  To  account  for  this 
possibility, we include in [19] and [20] the logarithm of the import-weighted industry-specific real exchange 
rate, taken from OECD (2007). 
37 
The impact of nation-wide institutions, when homogeneous across sectors, is controlled for in equations 
[19] and [20] by country per year dummies. However, certain labour market institutions might not have the same 
impact on training in all sectors. More specifically, Haltiwanger et al. (2006) and Micco and Pages (2006), 
convincingly  suggest  that  the  impact  of  lay-off  regulations  on job turnover  varies  according  to  the  natural 
propensity  of  industries  to  adjust  their  labour  input.  They  show  that  almost  all  the  variation  in  the  cross-
country/cross-sector distribution of job turnover can be explained by the distribution of job turnover in the 
United States (that is the OECD country with the least regulated labour market) and country dummies, and that 
the remaining variation can be explained by an interaction between a country-specific indicator of regulatory 
stringency and US job turnover rates by sector. Bassanini et al. (2009) use the same methodology to explore the 
impact of lay-off regulations on productivity growth. We use the industry-level job turnover rate in the US 
(TURN) from  Haltiwanger  et  al.  (2006)  and  interact  it  with  the  OECD  aggregate  measure  of  employment 
protection legislation (EPL), so as to obtain an indicator of EPL impact that varies by country, sector and time. 
Union power might also vary along these three dimensions. In order to capture this effect we use data on union 
density from Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). However, these data are available only for macro-sectors. Therefore 
we cannot do anything better than attributing their macro-sector averages to each sub-sectors.  
Exact variable definitions, sources and sample statistics are provided in the Appendix and in Bassanini 
and Brunello (2007). Since ELFS data are collected early in the calendar year, all non-ELFS data, which usually 
refer to yearly averages or unknown months, are lagged one year.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
We start our analysis by examining the association between regulation and training participation at the 
                                                 
34 The computed cost of capital is available only for fewer observations (1120) and completely missing in one country 
(Ireland). 
35 Yet, given that induction training is likely to occur in the very few weeks after hiring and we exclude workers with less 
than one month of tenure, we probably already control for part of this effect. 
36 We have experimented also the investment rate, drawn from the OECD STAN database, and the level and growth of 
productivity, drawn from the GGDC 60-industry database, to control for possible endogeneity of regulation with respect to 
productivity. However, none of these controls turns out significant and they have no impact on estimated coefficients. 
37 We also experiment with import penetration with virtually identical results. Yet, while industry-specific exchange rates, 
by depending only on imports at a specific date preceding the sample, can be assumed as exogenous, given that double-
dimension dummies are added to the specification, import penetration ratios are clearly endogenous. 17 
 
industry level. We estimate linear specifications (eq. [19]) with the dependent variable expressed in terms of 
training flows by OLS (Table 1, Panel A) and the corresponding GLM specifications (eq. [20]) by QMLE (Table 
1, Panel B). Each Panel in Table 1 is organized in five columns: the first column includes only the product 
market regulation indicator and (bi-dimensional) fixed effects, which appear in all the columns; column (2) also 
includes gender, education, the log worked hours gap and the import weighted real exchange rate;
38 column (3) 
adds age, firm size, and employment growth; column (4) the logarithm of R&D intensity; and column (5) labour 
market institutions. Similar results (available from authors upon request) are obtained using BEVI in alternative 
to REGNO. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of training as function of the index of product market regulation REGNO, which 
excludes public ownership.  
Panel A: Linear specification estimated by OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Regulation, excluding public own. (REGNO)  -0.014  -0.015  -0.014  -0.017  -0.015 
[3.24]***  [3.29]***  [3.00]***  [3.47]***  [3.29]*** 
Percentage with low education    -0.141  -0.129  -0.147  -0.141 
  [3.11]***  [2.73]***  [3.06]***  [3.10]*** 
Percentage with intermediate education    -0.065  -0.069  -0.073  -0.064 
  [1.51]  [1.37]  [1.64]  [1.48] 
Percentage females    0.070  0.068  0.076  0.075 
  [1.82]*  [1.71]*  [1.82]*  [1.90]* 

































Logarithm of R&D intensity       
-0.004 
[1.33]   
Union density       
  0.000 
[0.55] 
EPL times US job turnover       
  -0.007 
[0.11] 
           
Estimated elasticity of training wrt regulation   -0.472  -0.494  -0.490  -0.500  -0.492 
Country by sector dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Country by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Sector by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Number of observations  1236  1224  1188  1061  1224 
 
                                                 
38 As short- and long-run effects of the exchange rate on trade usually differ, import weighted real exchange rates are lagged 
one extra time. We also experimented with a 3-year moving average with virtually the same results. 18 
 
Table 1 (continued).  
Panel B: GLM specification estimated by QMLE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Regulation, excluding public own. (REGNO)  -0.141  -0.161  -0.175  -0.151  -0.167 
[3.84]***  [4.40]***  [4.22]***  [4.25]***  [4.51]*** 
Percentage with low education    -2.005  -1.938  -2.045  -1.988 
  [4.38]***  [4.03]***  [4.38]***  [4.36]*** 
Percentage with intermediate education    -0.679  -0.646  -0.737  -0.638 
  [1.93]*  [1.76]*  [2.12]*  [1.80]* 
Percentage females    0.737  0.672  0.643  0.713 
  [1.91]*  [1.71]*  [1.69]*  [1.84]* 

































Logarithm of R&D intensity       
-0.069 
[1.83]*   
Union density       
  0.001 
[0.18] 
EPL times US job turnover       
  -1.828 
[1.57] 
           
Estimated elasticity of training wrt regulation   -0.279  -0.316  -0.345  -0.319  -0.329 
Country by sector dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Country by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Sector by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Number of observations  1236  1224  1188  1061  1224 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: training participation rates. Elasticities are estimated at the sample means computed only 
for exposed industries. Robust t-or z-values within brackets. *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
In the two panels the association between regulation and training is always negative and statistically 
significant. Training incidence is significantly lower when the share of low educated individuals – with ISCED 
less than 3 – is higher, a standard result in the training literature (see Bassanini et al, 2007). Consistently with the 
finding of Sepulveda (2002) we also find that training incidence is countercyclical. Employment growth is 
positively  associated  to  training  but  its  coefficient  is  very  imprecisely  estimated.  Furthermore,  the  import-
weighted real exchange rate is negatively related to training in a (weakly) significant way, yielding some support 
to the idea that, for the tradeable sector, globalisation can have an additional effect on training independently of 
deregulation. 
There is some evidence that training incidence is higher in industries employing more women, a result in 
line with the literature as regards to Europe (see Bassanini et al., 2007 for a survey), and no evidence that age, 
the industry's firm size distribution and employment growth matter for training. When log R&D intensity is 
included to control for investment in intangibles, regulation remains significant, while log R&D intensity appear 19 
 
to attract a negative coefficient, although only weakly significant.
39 Finally, union density is unrelated to training 
while EPL does not appear to have a significantly greater effect in high turnover industries.  
In the exposed industries the estimated elasticity of training with respect to changes in product market 
regulation varies with the selected indicator and with the estimation method. Focusing on the indicator REGNO 
and evaluating elasticities at the sample means in the exposed industries, we find that a 10% decrease in REGNO 
would increase training incidence by 4.7% to 5.0% percent in the linear model – depending on the specification 
used – and by 2.8% to 3.4% percent in the GLM specification
40. These are economically significant effects, 
taking into account the fact that regulation indicators slumped by almost 50% in the sample period in the 
exposed industries.   
Since there are only 15 countries in our sample, we ask whether our results are driven by one specific 
country. Figure 3 plots the estimates of the parameter of interest, which captures the impact of REGNO on 
training, obtained by excluding one country at a time for our preferred specification (Table 1, Panel B, Column 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity to country coverage 
 
Note: The figure shows central estimates and confidence intervals obtained by re-estimating the model of Column 2 
in Panel B of Table 1 excluding one country at a time. 
 
Next, we check the robustness of our findings to changes in the dependent variable, and report our 
results in the four rows of Table 2 below. In particular, we replace our measure of training flows with alternative 
                                                 
39 The negative sign of the coefficient on R&D intensity might look surprising. Yet this is consistent with the evidence of 
lack of complementarity between R&D and training expenditures provided by Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2001). 






= ) | ( . 
41 In particular, it is reassuring that our results are not driven by the presence of Norway in the sample. It can be argued that, 
although intra-European trade barriers were lifted by the implementation of the SMP, trade barriers still exist with respect to 
non-European countries and these barriers are not captured by real industry-specific exchange rates. A further refinement of 
our strategy consists therefore in restricting the sample to EU members only (thus excluding Norway). Since EU trade 
policy is common to all EU member countries, there is no cross-country variation in sector-specific tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, which are therefore entirely controlled for by industry-by-time dummies. 
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measures of training stocks, as described above. We find that in all cases that the negative relationship between 
training and product market regulation is confirmed by the data. Moreover, the estimated elasticities suggest that 
a 10 percent reduction of regulation increases training stocks by 1.2 % to 4.3 %, depending on the selected 
definition of the stock.
42 
 
Table 2. Estimates of training stock as a function of REGNO. Alternative measures 
  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Training stock – base measure  -0.062  -0.204 
[2.62]***   
Training stock – alternative measure based on observed growth rates  -0.130  -0.426 
[4.51]***   
Training stock – alternative measure assuming 2% steady state growth   -0.037  -0.122 
[2.15]**   
Training stock – alternative measure assuming 2.5% steady state growth   -0.037  -0.123 
[2.16]**   
      Notes: Dependent variable: log of training stocks. Each row corresponds to a different measure. Base measure 
computed by assuming that industry-specific steady state growth rates of training stocks are equal to observed mean 
growth  rates  of  training  participation  rates  in  industries  where  this  is  positive  and  0  elsewhere.  In  row  2,  the 
observed mean growth rates of training participation are used for all industries. In row 3, a constant 2% steady state 
growth rate of training stock is assumed. In row 4, a constant 2.5% steady state growth rate of training stock is 
assumed. Elasticities are estimated at the sample means computed only for exposed industries. Robust t-values 
within brackets. *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
An alternative to the direct estimation of the relationship between regulation and training is to estimate 
how training is affected by profitability, measured by the observed Lerner index, and to instrument the latter 
with a measure of product market regulation. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to disentangle 
the effect of regulation on profitability from the effect of profitability on training. The disadvantages are greater 
measurement errors and the fact that profitability needs to be treated as endogenous in training regressions. We 
estimate the linear model by two-stage least squares and the GLM model using the control function approach 
suggested by Smith and Blundell (1986), using regulatory indicators as instruments. The latter approach consists 
of two steps: in the first step, we regress the Lerner index on regulation and other controls; in the second step, we 
augment the GLM specification with the residual from the first stage regression, and obtain confidence intervals 
by bootstrapping (see Efron, 1987).  
The results from this exercise are presented in the two panels of Table 3 (as above, panel A for the linear 
model and panel B for the GLM model). As expected, we find that an increase in the Lerner index reduces 
training incidence and that regulation has a statistically significant positive correlation with the Lerner index (see 
bottom of the table). In addition, standard tests suggest that the Lerner index is endogenous.
43  
Depending on the specification of the linear model, a 1% increase in profitability is expected to reduce 
training by 1.38% to 1.79% percent, a large effect. These elasticities are smaller but still substantial when we 
consider the GLM logistic specification. In this case a 1% increase in profitability is associated to a 0.59% to 
                                                 
42 We consider four different measured of the training stock. They are all based on the perpetual inventory method described 
in section 2 above, but differ with respect to assumption concerning the steady state growth rate. Our preferred measure is 
computed by assuming that industry-specific steady state growth rates of training stocks are equal to observed mean growth 
rates of training participation rates in industries where this is positive and 0 elsewhere. As regards alternative measures, in 
the first, the observed mean growth rates of training participation are used for all industries; in the second, a constant 2% 
steady state growth rate of training stock is assumed (as assumed by Dearden, Reed and van Reenen, 2006); and in the third, 
a constant 2.5% steady state growth rate of training stock is assumed, which does not appear to be inconsistent with our 
data.  Using  the  latter  measure,  in  fact,  we  cannot  reject  2.5%  as  the  average  growth  rate  of  the  training  stock  in  all 
industries. 
43 In linear models, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity always reject the null of exogeneity of the Lerner index. In 
the case of IV estimates obtained using the control function approach, the first-stage residual always attracts a significant 
coefficient, which provides evidence of endogeneity. 
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0.80% reduction of training. Yet, in assessing the economic importance of this effect, one needs to take into 
account that the cross-country/cross-industry average range of percentage variation of the Lerner index over the 
sample period is about 7%, while regulatory indicators have varied in our sample by much more (50% on 
average in the treated industries). Interestingly, the estimated compounded effect of a deregulation – that is the 
derived estimated effect of deregulation on training via the effect of the former on the Lerner index – is very 
close to the estimate we obtain from reduced form models: a 10% drop in the regulation index is estimated to 
increase training by 4.4% to 5% in the linear model and by 2.9% to 3.6% in the GLM specification. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of training as function of the Lerner index, instrumented with REGNO. Dependent 
variable: training participation rates.  
Panel A: Linear model, 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Lerner Index 
-1.323  -1.419  -1.391  -1.187  -1.456 
[1.90]*  [2.00]**  [1.82]*  [2.27]**  [1.92]* 
Percentage with low education 
  -0.167  -0.169  -0.176  -0.171 
  [2.49]**  [2.48]***  [2.71]**  [2.49]** 
Percentage with intermediate education 
  -0.074  -0.071  -0.086  -0.083 
  [1.22]  [1.18]  [1.47]  [1.37] 
Percentage females 
  0.142  0.141  0.109  0.144 
  [2.31]**  [2.25]**  [2.10]**  [2.27]** 

































Logarithm of R&D intensity       
-0.017 
[2.11]*   
Union density       
  -0.002 
[0.96] 
EPL times US job turnover       
  0.149 
[1.05] 
           
Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test  (χ
2(1))  23.75***  24.70***  27.86***  25.89***  27.64*** 











Elasticity of training to the Lerner Index  -1.613  -1.749  -1.744  -1.381  -1.789 
Derivative of training wrt REGNO  -0.017  -0.018  -0.019  -0.019  -0.019 
Elasticity of training wrt REGNO  -0.445  -0.486  -0.488  -0.497  -0.488 
Country by sector dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 




Table 3 (continued). Estimates of training as function of the Lerner index, instrumented with REGNO. 
Dependent variable: training participation rates.  
Panel B: GLM, Two-step IV estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Lerner Index 
-11.08**  -12.44**  -13.62*  -9.36**  -13.59** 
[-69.09,-0.05]  [-71.03,-0.87]  [-130.0,0.04]   [-44.74,-0.96]  [-87.96,-1.41] 











Percentage with low education 
  -2.20*  -2.31*  -2.26**  -2.23* 
  [-4.13,0.02]  [-4.93,0.32]  [-4.04,-0.13]  [-4.43,0.45] 
Percentage with intermediate education 
  -0.76  -0.75  -0.85  -0.82 
  [-2.50,1.56]  [-2.60,3.45]  [-2.27,0.84]  [-3.00,1.57] 
Percentage females 
  1.27*  1.31*  0.86  1.29 
  [-0.43,4.02]  [-0.66,6.34]  [-0.48,2.90]  [-0.50,4.85] 

































Logarithm of R&D intensity       
-0.18* 
[0.50,0.01]   
Union density       
  -0.03* 
[-0.24,0.04] 
EPL times US job turnover       
  -0.70 
[-5.24,13.63] 
           
Coeff. of REGNO in the first-stage regression 
0.013** 
[0.008, 0.017]  
0.013** 
[0.008, 0.017]  
0.013** 
[0.008, 0.018]  
0.016** 
[0.011, 0.021]  
0.013** 
[0.008, 0.018]  
Elasticity of training to the Lerner Index  -0.651  -0.795  -0.729  -0.589  -0.795 
Derived elasticity of training wrt REGNO  -0.289  -0.359  -0.329  -0.317  -0.350 
Country by sector dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector by year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Number of observations  1120  1108  1084  985  1108 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: training participation rates. Elasticities with respect to the Lerner index are estimated at 
the global sample mean; elasticities with respect to regulation, excluding public ownership (REGNO), are estimated 
at sample means computed only for exposed industries. Robust t-values within brackets in Panel A. Bias-corrected 
bootstrapped confidence intervals at the 5% statistical level, obtained with 1000 replications, within brackets in 
Panel B. In Panel A: *, ** and *** means significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In Panel B, * and 
** means that the bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence interval at the 10% and 5% confidence level, respectively, 




Does product market deregulation affect workplace training, and if yes, in what direction? This paper 
has addressed this question both from an empirical and from a theoretical viewpoint. In our empirical analysis 
we have used repeated cross section data extracted from the European Labour Force Survey, and a sample of 15 
European countries and 12 industrial sectors, which we have followed for about 8 years. Our econometric 
estimates  show  that  an  increase  in  product  market  deregulation  generates  a  sizeable  increase  in  training 23 
 
incidence. More precisely, we show that the massive regulatory reforms undergone by European countries in 
certain service and utility industries, as quantified by changes in the OECD indicators of regulatory barriers, 
have raised competition, which in turn, has increased investment in workplace training. Our empirical results are 
robust  to  several  sensitivity  exercises.  They  highlight  that  an  important  link  in  the  relationship  between 
deregulation and productivity growth is the investment in human capital which takes place in firms.  
In order to provide an explanation for these findings, which seem to be at odd with what usually argued 
in  the  labour  economics  literature,  we  have  built  a  theoretical  model  of  workplace  training  with  imperfect 
competition in the product and labour market and ex-ante homogeneous firms that is sufficiently general to allow 
both general and specific training and wages being either set by bargaining or determined by the interaction 
between supply and demand.  
We have identified two contrasting effects at work: on the one hand, a reduction in the barriers to entry 
for a given number of firms compresses profits per unit of output, and thereby reduces training. On the other 
hand, and conditional on profits per unit of output, additional entry increases the output (and profit) gains from 
training, which facilitates investment. These output gains occur because additional training reduces the relative 
product price and the sensitivity of product demand to prices is larger, the greater the degree of competition in 
the product  market.  We  have  shown that the  balance  of  these  effects  implies  that a  deregulation increases 
training. 
Although we believe that the mechanism suggested by our theoretical model is a key determinant of the 
observed  empirical  patterns,  we  do  not  claim  that  this  model  provides  the  only  possible  explanation.  For 
example, if firms are heterogeneous, a negative relationship between the degree of stringency of anti-competitive 
regulation and training can emerge through alternative routes. In fact, if more efficient firms have also lower 
training costs and train more, one can expect that increasing competition will increase the market share of these 
firms and therefore average training.  
We believe, however, that the mechanism highlighted in our model will hold also in a model with firm 
heterogeneity. Disentangling the importance of different mechanisms would require sufficiently rich firm-level 
panel data that include information on training and enough regulatory variation. Unfortunately, firm-level panel 
data on training are scarce and we are not aware that a dataset with the above-mentioned characteristics is 
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A. Proof of Proposition 2.  
 
We start by establishing  
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T                      [A.2] 
 
in the expectation that ex-post employment L will be equal to the number of hired trainees T. In the absence of 
commitment, the employer and workers of an arbitrarily-chosen firm i cannot increase the value of the Nash 
maximand by choosing unilaterally  T Li < , if the bargaining parties of all other firms set  T L = in the second 
stage. 
 
Proof. In this combination of strategies, the symmetry of prices (Pi = P) implies that (see equation [6]) 
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In the absence of commitment and with ex-post bargaining over employment, we ask whether it would be 
profitable for a single bargaining pair, consisting of the employer and her workers, to set  T Li < , in contrast with 
first stage expectations. Unconstrained maximisation of the Nash maximand [3] yield equation [4] and 
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Using [A.3] into [A.4] and rearranging gives 
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Since  T Li <  is not chosen and  T Li > is not feasible, because training in the second period is ruled out, the only 
feasible solution is  T Li = , in line with first-stage expectations. QED. 26 
 
 
Next we establish 
 
Lemma A2.2. Consider the first stage strategies of an employer i, who chooses training intensity  i τ  and the 
number of trainees  i T , and assume that, in the absence of commitment, wages  i W  and employment  i L  are 
bargained over in the second stage to maximise the Nash maximand. Then, for any combination of strategies 
chosen by other firms and workers, an accommodating strategy, which consists in choosing  i T  such that  i i T L ≤  
is not binding in the second stage, is less profitable than a non accommodating strategy, which selects a value of 
i T  low enough that in the second stage the equality  i i T L =  holds. 
 
Proof. Suppose that the firm chooses in the first strategy a training intensity  i τ  and a number of trainees  i T  
sufficiently large that, given  i τ , the constraint  i i T L ≤  is not binding in the second stage. In the second stage, 
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where  P P i /  is given by [A.4], except that τ  must be replaced with  i τ . There can be two cases: either  i i L T =  or 
i i L T > . Since the employer can anticipate the result of the bargaining, her net profits will be always higher if 
she sets  i i L T = , where Li is defined as in [A.7]. With no loss of generality we can therefore concentrate on this 
type of strategy (call it “A-strategy” hereafter, with A standing for accommodating, since with this strategy the 
firm accommodates the employment resulting from the unconstrained bargaining).  
  Consider now an alternative strategy in which the firm chooses in the first stage the same  i τ  but a lower 
value of  i T , denoted with 
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where 













+ =  and the  star  *  indicates  the  new  strategy  (called  “S-strategy”, 
hereafter, where S stands for “low”, since it implies a smaller number of trainees). Since  i i L T <
*  and Li is the 
result  of  the  unconstrained  maximisation  of  the  Nash  maximand  given  i τ ,  the  S-strategy  implies  that  the 
employment constraint 
* *
i i T L = is binding in the second-stage.  






































A ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
2
        [A.8] 
 











































) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (         [A.9] 
 
The right-hand side terms of equations [A.8] and [A.9] are identical, except for the value of relative prices. 
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will  be  such  that  L p Π = Π ) ( ,  when  P P p i / = ,  and  S p Π = Π ) (   when  P P p i /
* = .  Define 
{ } ) ( max arg max p p p Π = . The first-order conditions for a maximum imply  
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while the second-order condition is always verified since  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( /
2 2 < − − = ∂ Π ∂ θ δ p . Using [A.4] and some 
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Therefore  A S Π > Π , which implies that the A-strategy is dominated by the S-strategy. QED.  
 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 2. Consider the commitment equilibrium where each firm sets τ  
and  T  in the first stage as in equations [A.1] and [A.2], in the second stage the bargaining parties set W 
according to equation [4] and  T L = . In order to show that this is an equilibrium we need to show that no agent 
can deviate unilaterally from it and earn a greater pay-off if the others do not deviate. From Lemma A2.1, it 
follows immediately that no bargaining party can deviate unilaterally in the second stage and earn a greater pay-
off by choosing  T L ≠  in the second stage. Then, consider first-stage deviating strategies  ) , (
* *
i i T τ . Let us call 
again A-strategy any strategy such that the constraint 
*
i i T L ≤ is not binding in the second stage (as above A for 
“accommodating”). Similarly, let us call NA-strategies, first-stage strategies such that 
*
i i T L ≤  is binding in the 
second stage (NA for “non accommodating”). Lemma A2.2 shows that for any A-strategy there exists at least 
one NA-strategy (the corresponding S-strategy) that yields higher profits. Therefore, if there existed a deviating 
A-strategy that is profit-improving with respect to the equilibrium, there would also be a deviating NA-strategy 
that is profit-improving. But, by construction, the commitment equilibrium consists of the combination of NA-
strategies  that  yields  the  highest  profit  among  all  NA-strategies,  which  excludes  the  possibility  of  profit-
improving NA-strategies. Therefore there cannot exist profit-improving A strategies. As first-stage strategies are 
either A-strategies or NA-strategies, there are no deviations in the first-stage that yield higher profits. 
It remains to prove that the equilibrium is unique. Lemma A2.2 shows that strategies A are dominated, 
therefore no equilibrium can contain all or a fraction of firms playing A-strategies. But subsection 1.1.1 has 
already shown that there cannot be any other equilibrium in which all firms in the first stage play NA-strategies, 
except the commitment equilibrium, which is therefore unique. QED 
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B. The equilibrium when the cost of entry is fixed 
 
  Assume that the cost of entry C is fixed, rather than proportional to output. Equilibrium conditions [12] 
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We  show  here  that  the  negative  relationship  between  entry  costs  and  training  intensity  still  holds:  total 
differentiation of [A.19] and [A.20] yields  
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Since, when  +∞ < θ  and  0 > C , the determinant of the Jacobian is negative, and  






we have that  0 < dC
dτ . 
 
C. Definition of variables, sources and descriptive statistics 
See Bassanini and Brunello (2007) for the precise definition of variables and sources, except for the following 
additional variables:  













where x stands for the import-weighted real exchange rate, m is to the import share from country l in industry i of 
country k at a fixed time period t0 (early 1980s in these data) - the import weights thus vary across industries and 
countries but are constant in time - e is to the nominal bilateral exchange rate between countries k and l at time t 
- which varies across partner countries and time, but not across industries - the p variables refer to price levels, as 
approximated by the GDP deflator, in countries l and k respectively. Within a country in a given year, the 29 
 
variation in industry-specific real exchange rates derives entirely from differences in the import pattern across 
industries. An increase in the industry-specific exchange rate represents a real depreciation in the price of output 
produced in industry i of country k relative to its trading partners (weighted by import shares). Put differently, an 
increase in the industry-specific exchange rate represents an improvement in the terms of trade in industry i for 
country k. Source: OECD (2007). 
R&D intensity 
Definition: ratio of Business Enterprise Expenditures in R&D to value added. Source: OECD STAN, ANBERD 
and R&D Databases. 










where L is the observed Lerner index in country i, industry j and time t, CV are variable costs in nominal terms 
and Y is the value of output (see e.g. Klette, 1999). In practice, CV is the sum of intermediate inputs costs, 
labour  costs  and  estimated  cost  of  capital.  Capital  stock  is  constructed  by  perpetual  inventory  method  for 
countries where it is not provided in national accounts at a sufficiently disaggregated level. However, since 
reconstructed capital stocks are available only in volume terms, in practice nominal capital stocks are obtained 
by dividing them by value added in volume terms and pre-multiplying them by nominal value added. In the 
calculation of the cost of capital, we follow Griffith et al. (2006) and assume that capital flows freely across 
borders so that all countries face a world interest rate, for which we use the US long-term interest rate. Sources: 
OECD STAN and EO databases. 
List of countries 
Austria,  Belgium,  Germany,  Denmark,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  UK,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. 
 
Table A1. List of industries.  
NACE Rev. 1  Description 
15-16  Food products, beverages and tobacco manufacturing 
17-19  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear manufacturing 
20  Wood and wood products manufacturing 
21-22  Pulp, paper and related products manufacturing, printing and publishing 
23-25  Chemical and fuel products manufacturing, rubber and plastics 
26  Other non-metallic mineral products manufacturing 
27-28  Basic metals and fabricated metal products manufacturing 
34-35  Transport equipment manufacturing 
29-33  Other machinery and equipment manufacturing 
40-41  Electricity, gas and water supply 
60+62  Land and air transport 
64  Communications services 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics.  
 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard deviation 
Training participation rate  1236  0.078  0.075 
Training stock  1236  0.476  0.457 
REGNO  1236  0.820  1.593 
BEVI  1236  0.790  1.584 
Share males  1236  0.756  0.143 
Average age   1236  38.86  1.465 
Share firms with > 50 employees  1200  0.561  0.223 
Share low education  1224  0.373  0.209 
Share medium education  1224  0.463  0.177 
Import weighted real exchange rate  1236  1.297  1.914 
Hours gap  1236  0.002  0.012 
Employment growth  1236  -0.002  0.037 
Union density  1236  44.526  24.69 
EPL*TURN  1236  0.411  0.168 
Lerner index  1120  0.100  0.062 
        EPL*DOWN                 CESifo Working Paper Series 
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